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Abstract
Fake news, Post-Truth are now entries into the ordinary language of contemporary 
politics to denote - with anxiety and concern - the definitive rupture of the relationship 
between truth and politics. A relationship that has never been idyllic and that cannot be, 
constitutively, idyllic, but which now seems to have reached a point of no return. Gloss-
ing the reflections of Hannah Arendt in Truth and Politics and pointing out two areas 
of “political licence” - that is, two areas where, inevitably, politics cannot be judged on 
parameters of truth - this contribution aims to treat the weakness of shared truths not 
as a cause of the crisis of democracies, but as a symptom of a more radical problem, an 
extreme subjectivism that leads to loneliness and intolerance towards any relationship 
based on trust.
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Resumen
Fake news, Post-Truth son palabras que han entrado en el lenguaje ordinario de la 
política contemporánea para denotar -con ansiedad y preocupación- la ruptura defini-
tiva de la relación entre verdad y política. Una relación que nunca ha sido idílica y que 
constitucionalmente no puede serlo, pero que ahora parece haber llegado a un punto 
sin retorno. Glosando las reflexiones de Hannah Arendt en Verdad y Política y señalan-
do dos áreas de «licencia política» - es decir, en las que, inevitablemente, la política 
no puede juzgarse en función de los parámetros de verdad -, esta contribución pre-
tende tratar la debilidad de las verdades compartidas no como la causa de la crisis de 
las democracias, sino como un síntoma de un problema más radical, un subjetivismo 
extremo que desemboca en soledad e intolerancia hacia cualquier relación de confianza.
Palabras clave
Hannah Arendt, Trust, Weltbild, verdad filosófica, verdad objetiva, subjetivismo.
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The liaison between truth and politics –which has existed ever since politics came 
into being– is literally dangereuse, for various reasons. First, it describes a field of rela-
tions that is inevitably spurious, changing, porous, wherein all clarifying and Manichae-
an extremisms are impracticable (the effects of too much or too little truth are equally 
unpolitical). Second, it implies a preliminary definition of what is authentically political, 
and, therefore, what its tasks and legitimate tools are. Third, truth is a single signifier 
with different meanings, so much so that all definitions are usually accompanied by 
specifying adjectives or complements –truth of reason, factual truth, scientific truths, 
vérité à faire, etc–. Hence we get a whole host of particular relations between different 
politics and truths (plural). Then, further complicating a situation that is already in-
tricate in itself is the diachronic perspective: that is, how to judge and account for the 
socially widespread sensation that we are at present seeing of a particular degeneration 
of the relationship between politics and truth? While it is certainly necessary to avoid 
abandoning oneself to apocalyptic catastrophism –o tempora, o mores!– or postulating 
the lack of any historical precedent to the contemporary post-truth politics, it is never-
theless equally important to take this sensation seriously. We need to register the grow-
ing difficulty to identify a common world (of meanings, facts and evidence) upon which 
to construct political subjectivations, alliances, conflicts, and question ourselves as to 
the democratic sustainability of this (growing) rate of political solipsism. 
It certainly cannot be said that politicians, even in democratic systems, have begun 
to lie now; and yet the landscape painted in these times is uncanny, with new elements. 
The twentieth-century political conflict was deemed to be rooted in the different eval-
uations given to substantially agreed facts and meanings considered objective because 
they were to a certain extent unavailable to single people. But this subdivision no longer 
seems to hold. The world is now the theatre of the self, the stage on which alternative 
facts and subjective meanings proliferate. It has become impossible to group people 
around shared political values (freedom, justice and equality) because nothing about 
those values is shared anymore, not even their meanings, which these days are totally 
left up to individual preferences and idiosyncrasies. Therefore, the public discussion 
becomes a cacophonous babel of private languages, with the sole point of agreement 
possible summed up in the slogan of the new type of democracy: we agree to disagree, 
that is, we acknowledge the abyss between us, while undertaking not to fill it.
This paper is divided into three parts: the first section will take the form of a de-
scriptive note on Hannah Arendt’s Truth and Politics, a piece of writing which both 
maps out the controversy while ruling out Manichaean solutions, and introduces 
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expressions particularly useful for a diagnosis of the present day. In the second sec-
tion, I will try to give a more detailed definition of two elements of political licence: 
two political spheres in which the true/false dichotomy is completely out of place. In 
the third section, I will concentrate more on our world: the idea is to treat the weak-
ness of shared truths not as the cause of the crisis of democracies, but as a symptom 
of a more radical problem. 
T-T-W: Truth - Trust - World
In 2017 the television series broadcast by CBS, The Good Fight, came out in the USA, 
telling the story of a medium-sized Afro-American law firm located in Chicago in the 
present-day America of Trump, the alt-right and reclaimed racism. In the second sea-
son, which came out in 2018, one of the protagonists, Diane Lockhart, partner in the 
firm with a history of civil rights activism, starts to feel a growing sense of unease and 
alienation. The stabilizing force of law seems to have vanished –this was a country of 
laws!– while she discovers that values, principles and procedures she believed shared by 
the majority to instead be minority and fiercely detested, as if Trump’s election had let 
out a ferocious snarl that had been kept under wraps for decades (Alagna, 2018). On 
more than one occasion, when chatting with friends and colleagues, this sense of disori-
entation comes back to her: she no longer recognizes her city, her country or this world. 
In effect, she feels out of this world, incapable of even understanding what is going on. 
She starts to use mild hallucinogenic drugs, paradoxically with the aim of maintaining 
the minimal state of mental balance needed to live in society. However, this ends up ex-
panding the blurred area between reality and fantasy, truth and dystopia. During long, 
sleepless nights she watches television documentaries on the pig that Trump is said to 
have adopted at the White House, or presidential tweets concerning goats to take to 
the G8 summit. Afraid of revealing her confusion, she does not talk to anyone about it, 
tearing herself up with doubt: is what she is seeing real or is it an effect of the drugs? In 
reality, we spectators also remain in doubt. Excepting some scenes, which are obviously 
just for entertainment value, many of Diane’s “illusions” seem pretty real, giving the 
uncanny effect of sharing the character’s sense of instability, uncertainty and weakness. 
As if there were no longer a stable and shared world to stand upon. In other words, “con-
ceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it is the ground on 
which we stand and the sky that stretches above us” (Arendt, 2006, p. 264).
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The previous quote is taken from an article that Hannah Arendt published in 1967 
in The New Yorker entitled ‘Truth and Politics’, an essay of utmost importance, if only 
for the complexity that it manages to reconstruct. In the span of around 50 pages, not 
always following a linear movement, Arendt classifies different types of truth and their 
strength, each one of which developing a particular relationship with politics. By writ-
ing off all Manichaeisms and postulates of one sort’s absolute domination over the other, 
Arendt draws a picture in which the truth appears both fundamental and alien to pol-
itics. Fundamental insofar as “no permanence, no perseverance in existence, can even 
be conceived of without men willing to testify to what is and appears to them because it 
is” (Arendt, 2006, p. 229). Without truth one cannot rely on or build a common world, 
all stability needed for shared action among people is lost, replaced by an unbearable 
trembling.2 And yet, for at least two reasons at the same time it is constitutively alien. 
First, owing to a sort of (mobile) ontology of truth, insofar as all truths, of any kind, seem 
to transform into opinion the moment they are voiced in the political sphere. When 
the philosophical truth tries to impose itself in public, it entrusts itself to violence –and 
therefore barters its coercive strength for physical coercion– or becomes just one among 
several opinions: “for truth would then owe its prevalence (…) to the agreement of the 
many. Who might change their mind tomorrow and agree on something else” (p. 246).3 
The situation is similar for factual truth, constitutionally at the mercy of witnesses (who 
can be false), archives (which can be manipulated), or documents (which can be hidden 
or disputed) (pp. 242-244). Second, truth is alien to politics for reasons of the ontology 
of politics: politics is changing the world and non-truth –whether this be lies, illusion or 
imagination– at the same time testifies human freedom and its possibility of releasing 
itself from the existent to plan for something different and, strategically, constructs the 
preconditions to implement and create the new and different –lies are more revolution-
ary than truth– (pp. 250-251, pp. 258-259).
On leafing through Arendt’s text, the situation looks grey for Diane (and for us): 
“The experience of a trembling wobbling motion of everything we rely on for our sense 
of direction and reality is among the most common and most vivid experiences of men 
under totalitarian rule” (Arendt, 2006, p. 258).4 The feelings that Diane confides to her 
2 ‘Consistent lying, metaphorically speaking, pulls the ground from under our feet and provides no other ground on which 
to stay’. (Arendt, 2006, p. 264). 
3 ‘Philosophical truth, when it enters the market place, changes its nature and becomes opinion.’(Arendt, 2006, See p. 238). 
4 “If the past and present are treated as part of the future – that is, changed back into their former state of potentiality – the 
political realm is deprived not only of its main stabilizing force but of the starting point from which to change, to begin 
something new. What then begins is the constant shifting and shuffling in utter sterility which are characteristic of many 
new nations that had the bad luck to be born in an age of propaganda.” (Arendt, 2006, p. 258). 
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friends are worryingly similar to those that Arendt describes as typical of a life under 
totalitarian rule. Of course, I do not want to suggest undue and even historically offen-
sive comparisons, but to point out a strange likeness of sensations. Besides, “freedom 
of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves 
are not in dispute” (p. 238). Anyway, it is not my purpose to go through all of Arendt’s 
reasoning; instead, what I would like to do is try to concentrate on two issues, using 
Arendt to understand, and in part perhaps to help, Diane Lockhart. The two key words 
are: (political) world and trust.
While the relationship between truth and politics is somewhat paradoxical in its 
general appearance –since truth is both fundamental and alien to politics–, this para-
doxicality is specifically found and reproduced in the relationship between truth and 
the (political) world. It is a particular type of hiatus, which needs to be accepted and 
used precisely to establish substantially trusting forms of contact between the two poles 
of truth and politics.
If observed through Arendt’s filter, Diane Lockhart’s sense of disorientation is two-
fold, concerning two different spheres: philosophical truth and factual truth. The first 
arises from the discovery that not all people ‘hold these truths to be self-evident’, to 
paraphrase the incipit of the Declaration of Independence. This means that not all of us 
recognize ourselves in the values and principles that Diane considers absolutely unshak-
able and thought were shared: equality, freedom and democracy.5 What counts most in 
this context is that Diane’s disorientation tips totally towards the outside: it derives from 
the discovery that those values are not universally accepted, while she continues to fos-
ter no doubt as to their evident truth. It is the same disorientation as Socrates (and only 
in part as Plato): truths of this type, philosophical truths, are not of this world, or at least 
not of this cave. It was a (fortunate) historical coincidence that those truths, transformed 
into opinions, enjoyed widespread consent. Nevertheless, was Diane to remain the only 
one to believe in them, this fact would not undermine their certainty (for her) nor rid 
them of any of their potential activating force. This means that “the relatively transcen-
dent qualities of such political principles as freedom, justice, honor and courage (…) 
may inspire, and then become manifest in, human action” (Arendt, 2006, p. 243). The 
alienation of philosophical truths from the world –their ‘relative transcendence’– im-
munizes their practical strength against changes in current opinions; within them, they 
5 Welcome on board, Diane! – Arendt would say. Those truths were thought to be evident, and this already means that “the 
statement ‘All men are created equal’ is not self-evident, but stands in need of agreement and consent – (…) equality, if it is 
to be politically relevant, is a matter of opinion, and not ‘the truth’” (Arendt, 2006, p. 246).
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contain “principles upon which men might act and which thus could become manifest 
in the world” (p. 249). In other words, by considering those truths evident, Diane can 
autonomously and singularly draw from them the strength to react and act: she can give 
into the temptation of Syracuse and advise an enlightened despot, she can accept the 
political challenge and pit opinion against opinion, she can –and this would be the most 
appropriate choice– embody those principles, as a consequence inform her existence, 
and bear testimony through her own example:
This teaching by example is, indeed, the only form of ‘persuasion’ that philosoph-
ical truth is capable of without perversion or distortion; (…) philosophical truth 
can become ‘practical’ and inspire action without violating the rules of the political 
realm [emphasis added] only when it manages to become manifest in the guise of 
an example. (p. 247-248).
It can be painful to be separated from the world. Nonetheless, it also implies keeping 
up the autonomous strength to act at all times, even in the most adverse conditions. As 
such, the transcendence of philosophical truths guarantees their autonomous capacity 
to prompt action and therefore to become manifest and return to the world. The em-
bodied truth is viral in its force, it restores trust in human potential, or rather it man-
ages to use the trust developed in the person –Socrates who does not flee, Diane who 
continues her battles– to bear witness to, strengthen and divulge the truth that he or 
she expresses. Therefore, it is trust that acts as the fundamental glue, the bridge linking 
philosophical truths and the world, the trust that Socrates earns by accepting the unjust 
penalty counts and is perceived as proof of the truth of what he was asserting: namely, 
that it is better to suffer evil than to commit it.
Diane’s second disorientation is more underhand: it concerns factual truth, the real 
circumstance of the possible adoption of a pig at the White House. These are worldly 
truths in the most radical sense of the word, not only do they concern the world as it 
is, but they are ontologically worldly, their status depends on concrete factors such as 
eye-witness accounts, documents, proof. They cannot be achieved on their own outside 
a context of relations –Diane remains in doubt precisely because she does not dare to 
ask, to exchange opinions–. Here personal example remains out of focus: affirming fac-
tual truth in a context of generalized errors or lies testifies to the parrhesiast’s courage, 
but does not corroborate the truth being shouted out. This is why, even though Arendt’s 
conclusions are optimistic in the end, “facts are superior to power” (Arendt, 2006, p. 259) 
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and “reality takes its revenge on those who dare to defy it” (p. 256), in other passages 
concerning factual truths, she admits that in some cases their very survival is at risk 
(p. 244).6 Therefore, the being of the world is risky, too risky, so much so that Arendt 
advises those asserting the factual truth to remain at a distance from the political 
world:
The teller of factual truth, when he enters the political realm and identifies himself 
with some partial interest and power formation, compromises on the only quality 
that could have made his truth appear plausible, namely, his personal truthful-
ness, guaranteed by impartiality, integrity, independence. (p. 250)
Those who tell the factual truth must at least in part cut themselves off from the 
world, assuming a “standpoint outside the political realm” (p. 259) able to guaran-
tee “non-commitment and impartiality, freedom from self-interest in thought and 
judgment” (p. 262). Arendt explains that the courts of law and universities need to 
be independent to guarantee a truth that cannot be accused of partisanship. Here 
the key role of trust is even more evident: factual truths are based on the credibility 
of those who uphold them. Their intrinsic weakness can only be compensated if the 
people and institutions called upon to assert factual truths are wholly above suspi-
cion. We trust in the witnesses; we trust in the documents, in the people who col-
lected them, safeguard them, classify them; we trust in the people who control the 
institutions devoted to ascertaining the truth and so on, in a domino effect whose 
central element is, only apparently paradoxically, no longer the truth in itself, but 
the trust in the people asserting it.
This is where the twofold paradoxicality of the relationship between truth and the 
(political) world lies, as reconstructed by Arendt: the truth is infrastructure, a founding 
element in a common world, but, in order to carry out this function, (philosophical) 
truth is or (factual) truth must be at least partially alien to the (political) world which is, 
and must be, the domain of opinion. And while, safe in its almost transcendent position, 
the task of philosophical truth is to appear in the world through example, factual truth, 
at the mercy of the world, has to gain space and distance itself at least in part from that 
same world. In both cases, a third, intrinsically relational element reconnects truth and 
the world: trust. 
6 Ibid., p. 244.
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Truth-making / Assuming the truth 
Despite the complexity and variety of the classification built by Arendt, I think it is 
possible to pinpoint two difficulties with her reasoning: the simultaneous under- and 
overestimation of the strength of politics in conditioning, imposing and divulging cer-
tain truths.
First of all, concerning factual truths, the examples used by Arendt are clear, unam-
biguous: Germany invaded Belgium and not the other way round; Trotsky had a role 
in the October Revolution, making the analysis a bit simpler. In reality, only in extreme 
cases does politics need to completely overturn the existent, asserting the totally false 
and denying or hiding the absolutely true. More often –or rather always, and inevi-
tably– politics “plays” with different truths: it emphasizes some, putting them on the 
centre stage and making them politically decisive, while it pushes others to the side-
lines, making them secondary and partially irrelevant. Moving within the real, politics 
selects some aspects of it, giving them importance and therefore practical force. It does 
not create the reality ex novo, but moulds it by seeking to highlight some elements to 
the detriment of others. Perhaps the most banal example is the birth and diffusion of 
a “national sentiment”, namely, the enhancement of national belonging as a politically 
decisive given. At a certain moment,
states began as never before to create national education systems; to impose stan-
dard national languages; to organize expositions, museums, artistic subventions, 
and others [sic] means of displaying cultural production or heritage; to construct 
communications networks; to invent national flags, symbols, anthems, holidays, 
rituals, and traditions. (Tilly, 2002, p. 165)
Little is completely invented in this state-led work to nationalize the masses. Instead, 
some “truths” are (have been) taken, encouraged, resignified and above all highlighted, 
blown up and absolutized; more than disowned and completely hidden, other forms of 
belonging are sterilized, marginalized and therefore made politically uninfluential. This 
triggers a circle of self-confirmation and self-empowerment of that politically driven 
truth: pushed by the idea of nation, states compete and clash with each other, boosting 
national sentiment, and providing new truths to celebrate, remember and monumen-
talize. When politically absolutized, a truth initially immersed in other truths helps to 
create a world in which it is effectively “more true” than others. Indeed, it may be an 
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inevitable process, a constitutive element of politics –as well as of law– which “reflects 
on what exists” while “actively ordering and modifying” it (Hauriou, 2004, p. 379, own 
translation). The same political language is intrinsically performative, even when it sets 
out to be realist: it reflects and assumes pieces of the real, while automatically placing 
upon them a surplus of importance and centrality, and therefore helping to alter the 
very thing it wishes to describe.7
Second –and in a substantially specular manner–, Arendt overestimates the capacity 
of politics to impose and divulge a philosophical truth (clearly in the form of a shared 
opinion). Again, the clearest example calls into question the Founding Fathers and the 
truths they considered evident. On discussing the inevitable metamorphosis of those 
truths into opinions, Arendt writes: “Their validity depends upon free agreement and 
consent; they are arrived at by discursive, representative thinking; and they are com-
municated by means of persuasion and dissuasion” (Arendt, 2006, p. 247). In other 
words, by doing politics –that is, imagining the positions of others in the mind and 
then discussing, communicating and debating in the townships and assemblies, with 
the strength of persuasion and maybe of example– those truths that became opinions 
achieved a sufficiently wide consensus to then be written into the act of constitution of 
a new political body. Namely, it is politics and its tools that have the power and the duty 
to develop those opinions (unduly called “truths”) and to try to divulge them as much 
as possible. Indeed, similar affirmations appearing in non-political spheres remain po-
litically sterile:
There exist (…) philosophical or religious statements that correspond to this 
opinion [i.e. equality] – such as that all men are equal before God, or before death, 
or insofar as they all belong to the same species of animal rationale – but none of 
them was ever of any political or practical consequence, because the equalizer, 
whether God, or death, or nature, transcended and remained outside the realm in 
which human intercourse takes place. (pp. 246-247)
In my view, it is an overestimation of the power of politics. More convincing to me 
is the idea, implicitly supported by Weber, that politics depends at least partially on 
discourses of truth (world images) over which it does not have complete control, and it 
7 At one extreme is Laclau and the concept of people, a politically driven discursive construction, wholly political sum 
of various questions linked by a significant void; this operation to construct the people is, for Laclau, the very essence of 
politics (Laclau, 2008). 
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   120 28/05/20   12:11
121
assumes and accepts as true. A world image is a set of cognitive assumptions about the 
world as a totality and about all the partial totalities that make it up (nature, humankind, 
society and history). These issues escape the true/false dichotomy because they concern 
objects which are by principle indemonstrable, the blind point of every possible enlight-
enment: whether the world is the stage for Providence or a jumble of nonsensical events; 
whether people are good or bad by nature; whether history is heading towards the best 
or descending towards the worst, no option can ever be verified without the shadow 
of a doubt, and yet it is inevitable to “choose one” in order to have a criterion for our 
practical orientation in the world. In fact, humankind has always taken an image to be 
true. This is why Blumenberg speaks of vérité à faire: a pragmatic truth, which expresses 
itself in the capacity to generate practical attitudes, to concretely direct human life in the 
world; a truth with “practical power” (Blumenberg, 2010, p. 29), “through which man 
understands himself, orients his evaluations and his practical objectives, assesses his 
possibilities and necessities and imagines himself in his essential needs” (Blumenberg 
1961, p. 69, own translation). These are unverifiable truths that impact on politics and 
define its possible evolution:
deciding questions such as: ‘are people good or bad by nature?’, ‘are they deter-
mined by their inclinations or by the environment?’ or ‘are they a factor or factum 
of their stories?’, can only be deferred or defined as senseless from a scientific point 
of view, not from a practical one. (Blumenberg, 1981, p. 126, own translation)
It takes a long time for world images to come into being and crystallize, through an 
always specific and situated relationship between ideal horizons –prophetic messages, 
religions, the intense activity of intellectuals, cultural uprisings in the broad sense– and 
material conditions. This is why to a certain extent they dominate over politics: they 
decide its magnitude, its ability to give sense to the lives of those devoted to it, its degree 
of inevitability, and give it a direction and room for possible evolution. On analysing re-
ligious world images, Weber marks how a vague idea such as redemption only assumes 
a specific meaning when seen through a Weltbild able to define “ ‘from what’ and ‘for 
what’ one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, ‘could be’ redeemed” (Weber, 
1991, p. 280). The definition of the good to pursue and the bad from which to flee has an 
impact, from the outside, on politics: if redemption is the peace of saints in the afterlife, it 
is more likely that institutions with a religious basis and inclination will acquire strength 
and legitimacy. Instead, if redemption is material well-being, then it will be institutional 
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forms that can boast greater productive and/or redistributive efficiency that will gain 
consent. In other words, more than imposing a true-discourse able to shape particular 
ways of living, politics and its institutions work if they are in line with the true-discourse 
represented by the world image and if they respond to and grasp the requirements and 
needs outlined by the Weltbild.
Arendt does not sufficiently emphasize the fact that there was already an underlying 
pre-political consensus over those “truths” between the Founding Fathers and Ameri-
can society due to a world image conditioned both by the specific material conditions 
and the Puritan imprint of that same society. The composers and heirs of the Mayflower 
Compact shared a religiously founded diffidence towards all authority, a hypertrophy of 
subjective ethical consciousness that disqualified the device of sovereignty and a sense 
of equality owing to a shared infinite distance from an omnipotent (and stern) God: “the 
Great God absolute! The centre and circumference of all democracy! His omnipotence, 
our divine equality!” (Melville, 1972, p. 212) Therefore, more than being created and 
spread in the townships and political discussions, those truths deemed evident made 
those townships and discussions possible, having already been created and diffused by 
a shared world image. Concerning truths by principle unverifiable but in practice in-
evitable, it is the world image and not politics that has the last word; in its intricate and 
always specific osmosis of ideal and material conditions, the world image decides over 
those truths that politics then transcribes, uses, accepts and makes its own. 
The ground trembling under our feet
Alternative facts, fake news, post-truth: these are some of the expressions most 
widely used in contexts of diagnosis of the present. In 2016 post-truth was even elected 
word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries: a prefix that seems to indicate not so much a 
discontinuity in time, as the ‘posts’ on Facebook and Twitter –which have become a fun-
damental political tool– and the abbreviation of military post, signalling how truth has 
become and is perceived as the outcome of battles between different powers: therefore, 
not a truth that imposes itself but is imposed.
In what way can what has been said so far help the uncanny sensation of a trembling, 
wobbling motion –as Arendt said– experienced by Diane and ourselves to be taken 
seriously? World image, performative power of politics, trust: these are the three poles 
that emerged as fundamental in defining the relations between politics and truth, and 
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it is along these three lines that I will try to understand what has changed, where the 
rupture took place that is driving Diane crazy. First of all, however, the explanation of 
an excellent exclusion: in this paragraph I will not deal with the topic of the Internet or 
the social media in particular –a subject that would be reductive to describe as “simple” 
political communication and which makes a great contribution to moulding subjectiv-
ities and society–. It is precisely because of its importance and centrality that it will not 
be examined here. I believe it requires exclusive reflection, using technical, journalistic, 
IT and semiological skills that I do not possess. Excepting not only conspiracy theories 
or extreme cases, but more profoundly, the political and economic contexts that direct 
their use,8 the independent legality and internal operating mechanisms of platforms 
such as those of the social media seem to empower phenomena that have a drastic im-
pact on the construction of shared truths, amongst which: the genesis of no-discussion 
bubbles of consent; the extreme simplification of the topics analysed; the speed of the 
news and the short-livedness of attention; the emotive-only turn of communication –if 
it bleeds it leads– and the bulimia of communication; and the role of irony in the public 
airing of extreme positions and questioning historical factual truths – see Pepe the Frog 
and the Holocaust.9 And this is just the tip of the iceberg; too many topics for just one 
paragraph.
Rather, if the world image really establishes the set of truths grasped and taken up 
by politics, there should always be a socially shared true discourse, a base on which to 
stand. So, what is the truth of our world, and why, despite this, is everything wobbling? 
To sum it up in a slogan, one could say: that is precisely the problem, the truth of our 
world image is that nothing is shared. More correctly, a completely nominalistic world 
image has asserted itself, with a dual insulating effect. On one hand, the senselessness of 
the world and its history is sanctioned; seeing the happenings in the world as a series of 
events without an objective direction implies that all guarantees against solitude are lost: 
individual action remains individual, it cannot be taken for granted that it will converge 
and integrate with other people’s action, or come together to form a wider action, or 
that there will be any support from others along the way. On the other hand, and more 
directly, nominalism means that universals are no longer believable: all that exists is 
8 See the article by B.Y. Fong on Jacobin, ‘Possiamo fare a meno di Twitter e Facebook?’, https://jacobinitalia.it/13680-2/?fb-
clid=IwAR1-np0XUAC2tgasDYRcDXsM7LcX48vuLRrdjE0AVVTCptBH06whyLUvBZ0. The piece claims that these plat-
forms have a sort political unredeemability: that is, the problem is not that they are private enterprises or their subsumption 
under capitalistic logics. Instead, it lies more deeply, in their logic and internal dynamics, which can cause relational and 
even psychological issues.
9 Topics analysed by a wide range of excellent literature, amongst which: Lolli, 2017; Duffy, 2018; Gambetta, 2018; 
Ziccardi, 2019; Nagle, 2017; Han, 2017.
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individuals and their demands. There is no such thing as society (also) means the ab-
solute centrality of the self, the sovereign right of all individuals to express themselves 
and construct inevitably subjective meanings. On one hand, self-realization, self-affir-
mation and authenticity are indicated as the supreme good to aspire to; on the other, 
they are only deemed declinable in radically singular forms, with any agglomeration 
thought of as forced. The world and others are not an integral and constitutional el-
ement of the self –a self that is formed in relation, with and against the resistances of 
the world–, but threats to the authenticity and freedom of expression of individuals 
who think themselves at the same time sovereign and “natural”, pre-relational and 
pre-social. The world and others therefore become the stage upon which to express 
and impose the self and a store of tools with which to potentially express and impose 
oneself.
This implies making all truths, whose objectivity allows them to act as a connector, 
binding together different individuals, out of reach. Not only does truth appear threat-
ening, since by definition it places limits on the single person’s free will, but more deeply, 
it is made inaccessible by taking the subjectiveness of building meanings to the extreme. 
Modern politics was based on assigning multiple evaluations to shared meanings; the 
shared and socially constructed meaning of an action or a conduct was then evaluated 
differently depending on the different political leanings. Today it is the very manufac-
ture of meaning that is a strictly individual skill: the same act means as many different 
things to as many observers. The sexual exploits of Donald Trump are read by Diane 
Lockhart as an unacceptable degradation and commodification of the female body, and 
by her colleague Roland Blum as the apotheosis of sexual emancipation, wherein free 
women freely choose what to do with their bodies, without arrogant liberals prescribing 
what is true freedom and true emancipation.
The political catchment basins of the modern era –which answered to names such as 
liberalism, socialism and nationalism– arose as conglomerations of interests and opin-
ions with a single, neat and clear meaning, with regard to which everyone took up a 
position. Today it is objectively impossible to define their meaning: they are subjectively 
loaded with different, at times contradictory meanings, broken up haphazardly accord-
ing to personal leanings. It is no longer shared opinions that connect individuals, but 
the individual who rises up as the only connector of different opinions, whose identity 
is substantiated through that very, potentially unique, and wholly personal, patchwork 
of opinions and beliefs. Within a nominalistic world image, therefore, the problem with 
truth lies in its claims to objectivity and independence from the single person’s will. The 
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problem of truth is that it wants to be shared, in a world image in which all sharing is at 
least potentially harmful to the single person’s sovereign rights.
The world as a stage, the necessary backdrop where every person’s exceptionality can 
be shown off, has little to do with the “world in common” which is both presupposition 
for and objective of political practice. And the loss of this reference to common truths 
produces that uncanny trembling. Therefore, political collectivities seem unstable and 
contingent conglomerations of unrelated atoms that form a momentary mass due to 
mere numeric aggregation. The public sphere cannot be a space of conflict, confron-
tation and changing opinions due to all people speaking their own language and re-
jecting all attempts at translation as inauthentic; so, this sphere “simply” becomes the 
place where the majority opinion counts –a technically prepolitical, entirely emotive, 
almost aesthetic opinion of personal taste, determined by private and fluctuating idio-
syncrasies and manipulable as streams of opinion, fear or hope–. It is an opinion –or 
rather political mutation of the truth– matured in solitude, that solitude that condemns 
Diane to blur the true and the false. However, politics is also responsible for this situ-
ation, having both grasped and empowered this extreme individualization, through a 
strict normative, juridical and cultural setting (Dardot & Laval, 2014). All of those hazy 
of tax and monetary provisions and social policies that go under the generic name of 
“neoliberalism” have definitely grasped the demands for individualization posed by the 
world image, but at the same time they have empowered them, juridically fastening 
them down, even imposing them on those who did not agree or in spheres where they 
had not yet arisen.
The world as the stage for the self, the relationship with others as competitive, in-
strumental to or dangerous for the free and sovereign expression of one’s subjectivity; 
the pivots of this world image weaken to the point of almost cancelling out that specific 
form of interpersonal relationship that Arendt already signalled –more or less implic-
itly– as fundamental in connecting truth and the political world: trust. Indeed, trust is 
always trust in others, it is a declaration of dependence on others and, in general, on 
the complex social construct we live. To trust someone or something is to renounce the 
sovereign and autarchic claim –illusion– that we alone can dominate all the essential 
variables for our existence. To trust is to allow ourselves to be called into question and 
be “contaminated” by others, building our own autonomy not against or regardless the 
relationship with the other, but within it. These reasons make a trust relationship partic-
ularly out of joint with the nominalistic image of the world. Taking up Arendt’s classifi-
cation again, those who try to embody and attest to a ‘philosophical truth’ by example 
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have a hard time: they are simply crazy or, more likely, they are hypocritically hiding 
selfish or egotistic interests in personal self-affirmation or social recognition –besides, 
is this not what they all do, what we all do? strikes up the vox populi.
It is in part a similar situation for the people or institutions which, according to 
Arendt, should guarantee the impartiality of factual truths, abstaining and distancing 
themselves from the political arena. It is before everyone’s eyes how these institutions 
and the people who enact and represent them are (increasingly perceived as) biased 
voices, intrinsically interested, if nothing else, in their own survival and prestige. The 
same possibility that such a distance exists is now being drastically called into question, 
not always with democratic effect:
Denouncing the cognitive limits of science and its compromises with political and 
economic power probably plays an ambivalent role towards ‘weak’ knowledge and 
interests: on one hand, it strengthens them; on the other, losing the protective um-
brella provided by producing knowledge temporarily accepted as solid, reliable 
and hence fair makes them even more fragile. If all voices are equally biased then 
the one that shouts the loudest is bound to play a base hand. (Pellizzoni, 2006)
What is more, the “factual truths” which should provide the basis and direction for 
our decisions and preferences are in reality intrinsically probabilistic outlooks. While 
Arendt relegated these truths to the past, contemporary political practice is based on 
models able to predict the future effects of certain choices. We adopt specific tax policies 
in the reasonable hope that they will produce certain results, but we are nevertheless 
forced to move in the ring of potentialities, always open to denial, and never in the field 
of “truth”. Not only do errors or interests always lie in wait, but the very complexity and 
speed of the existent undermine the solidity and reliability of these outlooks.10 There is 
no way out: even when, in formal loyalty to the eternal task of science, we accept and 
claim the temporariness of its results –which are always open to contest and review– 
this temporariness becomes a political alibi, being used to “scientifically” justify and 
therefore benefit some parties to the detriment of others.11
10 “Legislators may find themselves debating complex issues and potential objects of regulation which suddenly alter 
before their eyes, dramatically augmenting the hardships intrinsic to consensus building in the context of complex policy 
issues. They may finally succeed in pursuing a series of legislative initiatives only to discover that the social and economic 
presuppositions underlying their policy choices have already shifted” (Scheuerman, 2004, p. 48).
11 A canonical example of this situation is climate change: the inevitable lack of conclusive proof concerning its presence 
and anthropic nature is used to justify politics’ lack of action. 
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But, again, this is just the tip of the iceberg. With its resulting dependence, trust is 
particularly irritating for the contemporary subjectivity; it is a relationship which is 
avoided, hidden or juridically filtered as much as possible by both parties in the trust 
relationship. Those who should be the object of trust want to avoid the responsibilities 
connected to it, and those who should grant it experience it as a painful and unmoti-
vated loss of sovereignty. A real example is given by the institution, as sacrosanct as it 
is often actually farcical, of informed consent in the medical field: patients are offered a 
whole host of possibilities among which they can freely choose, while knowing that they 
are completely responsible for this choice (Chignola, 2018, pp. 117-120). However, the 
information needed for the consent is often unattainable: it would require time, data, 
exchanges of opinion, medical skills and skills to read the data that are not and cannot 
be rapidly at disposal. Therefore, the patients have to trust one doctor or another, and, 
at the same time, they have to and also want to believe that they have made a fully in-
dependent choice, while accepting the responsibility-evading pretence of being able to 
have real-time access to a wealth of skills and experience that others have amassed over 
years and years. The web of trust relations making up society is shrunk as much as pos-
sible –through a series of acquittances and personal assumptions of responsibility– and 
where it is not possible to eliminate, it is sterilized and hidden. When it emerges again 
in all its reality, it is thus seen as a usurpation of individual sovereignty, as unmotivated 
as it is violent.
The trembling that Diane feels is fully understandable, but it is not the disappearance 
of truth that is causing it. More than cause of the state of crisis of contemporary liberal 
democracies, post-truth is the visible symptom of a deeper problem, which in philo-
sophical terms could be rendered as hyper-individualism or radical subjectivism, which 
is perhaps best expressed using a word from ordinary language: solitude. When taken to 
the extreme by the nominalistic world image, the thought of autonomy as counterposed 
to relations, and freedom as absolute individual sovereignty, implies the loss of that 
objectivity –which can be called truth or shared opinions– able to connect individuals 
together. Diane’s problem is that she is alone in a world of lonely people, she is afraid of 
asking others for confirmation of their perceptions and has no public or political room 
in which to fiercely argue with those who do not share her truths, without stopping at 
agreeing to disagree.
In short, the demand of the day cannot be to restore a mythical (and unattainable) 
dominion of truth, dotting the ontological statute with those ‘truths deemed evident’, 
but instead to work on rebuilding relationships: by breaking isolation, reclaiming and 
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de-stigmatizing trust. If changing or imposing a new world image is the task of proph-
ets, it could be more sensible to imagine radically new institutions, capable of breaking 
the echo chambers and reopening spaces of conflict, confrontation and construction of 
a bare minimum of shared opinions, reconciling autonomy as the aspiration towards 
self-government with the frank acceptance of mutual dependence. As Duso writes on 
reconstructing and commenting the genealogy of the State-form, it is the idea of free-
dom as the possibility of isolation that enables the conjunction –or even the reciprocal 
implication– between individual and state sovereignty. The human material on which 
the State-form is based is the individual, individuals who are free because they are alone 
–and therefore free to privately pursue what is good for them–:
we find a close tie between (…) the affirmation of individual rights and the posi-
tion of an absolute power as the only possibility of their implementation. Being 
superior to all individuals, this gave them room to privately seek their own good, 
while avoiding mutual encounters and disturbance, that is, by creating the condi-
tions for their isolation. (…) The term ‘society’ (… is taken) to mean a situation 
in which freedom is created as the single people’s independence and therefore the 
possibility of their isolation. (Duso, 2007, pp. 73-74, own translation)
Perhaps we should start to imagine forms of institutionalization of our political 
co-existence different from the State, by trying to exploit that performative force of po-
litical language to give strength, relevance and power to forms of cooperation which, 
more or less “clandestinely”, already exist. The third season of The Good Fight begins 
with Diane Lockhart joining a group of militants called The Resistance.
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